The question of representation in the political process has long been of interest to citizens and scholars. For decades, political scientists have explored the question of whose voices are amplified by organized interests in the policy-making process; by now the dominance of business interests is a well-trod dictum.
1 While the explanations for this dominance are well known (e.g., Olson 1965 ; also see Moe 1980 and Salisbury 1984) , less attention has been paid to the loci of representation. Specifically, the structure of American government generally offers multiple points of access in which organized interests can press for policy change.
Thus representation or activity in any one single venue is not tantamount to representation or activity in the policy process as a whole. The question is not just who is represented, but where representation is sought, and the overall pattern of interest representation in the whole policy process, not just one part of it.
While the legislature generally plays a central role in the policy process, other branches make decisions that have great import for society. For example, the executive branch or independent agencies can often independently initiate policy changes of broad scope on issues within their jurisdiction. Legislative delegation to these agencies creates a measure of autonomy in administrative agencies (Carpenter 2001) , and makes the policy process as a whole more of a "parallel system" (Bendor 1985) . This parallel system results in multiple points of access for seekers of policy change and defenders of the status quo. Each offers unique opportunities for participation and representation: access to the administrative venue can increase the effectiveness of groups that may be disadvantaged in the legislative venue and vice-versa. Studying the way in which organized interests sort themselves across these different venues is therefore crucial for any assessment of representation in the policy process as a whole. In particular, the hopeful argument that formal requirements of openness and participation in bureaucratic policy-making can overcome the widely recognized biases in the pressure group system 2 essentially requires that some groups (ideally those disadvantaged in the legislature) sort disproportionately into administrative lobbying.
While the nexus of organized interest, congressional committees and administrative agen-cies once figured prominently in the interest groups literature in the form of the subgovernment, or iron triangles, approach (see, e.g., Griffith 1939 or Lowi 1969 , attention to interest group influence outside the legislative branch waned with the rise of the more amorphous issues network approach (see, e.g., Heclo 1978) in response to the rise of citizen groups and more open government (Walker 1991) . Further, the release of campaign finance data likely also prompted scholars to focus attention on the legislative branch.
3 Yet surveys of organized interests in Washington, D.C. indicate that groups place a great deal of importance on administrative lobbying. 80% of groups in Walker's (1991) 1980 survey of membership organizations indicated that administrative lobbying was very important, giving it a higher score than any other lobbying tactic, including legislative lobbying (78%). Three-quarters of the groups surveyed in 2002 by Furlong and Kerwin (2005) indicated that participating in rulemaking is more important that lobbying Congress; up from two-thirds in a similar survey from 1992 (Kerwin 2003) .
Because of such findings, scholars have begun to return to the question of interest group representation and influence in the bureaucracy over the last decade. In addition to the studies cited above, two strands of literature have emerged that focus on influence in the administrative branch. The first argues that interests can use the legislative branch as an intermediary (e.g., Gordon and Hafer 2005; Hall and Deardorff 2006) while the latter studies participation in administrative rulemaking through notice and comment procedures (see, e.g., Golden 1998; Furlong 1997; Furlong and Kerwin 2005; and Yackee and Yackee 2006) .
These latter studies tend to find that, as in the legislature, business groups comprise the largest category of claimants.
Importantly, these studies focus on representation solely in the administrative branch; similar to studies of the legislative branch they tell us little about representation across those two branches. To date, few studies make explicit comparisons between interest representation in these two policymaking venues: we know of only three such published studies. 4 The first two - Greene and Heberlig (2002) and Holyoke (2003) suggests that participation in the administrative arena does not alleviate any biases in the pressure group system in the legislature; rather, it primarily allows the "rich to get richer."
In addition, we provide a first look at the ecology of representation in the administrative branch inclusive of all groups, issues, and agencies. Our data suggest that administrative lobbying has been overlooked as a means of interest representation, with almost two-thirds of all groups indicating an interest in this venue. By extension, our study provides an important context for the growing literature on administrative lobbying (see, e.g., Golden 1998 and Yackee and Yackee 2006) that has found it difficult, in the absence of a baseline for comparison, to reconcile its finding that business interests are well represented with the existence of formal requirements for equal footing of participants.
Theoretical Expectations about Lobbying Activity
Before presenting our data and arguments, it is useful to consider what existing theories lead us to expect about lobbying activity within a separation of powers system with multiple points of access. For reasons of clarity and parsimony, most extant theories of the legislative-bureaucratic relationship portray the distinction between the two branches as clear-cut, a necessary and useful simplification. This simplification enables a representation of the legislative-bureaucratic relationship as one of a principal-agent problem, as utilized by Epstein and O'Halloran (1990) , Sloof (1998 Sloof ( , 2000 , Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) , Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty (2006) , and Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) . 5 All of these theories share a common theme: under what types of conditions will discretionary authority be granted to an agency whose policy preferences differ from that of the median legislator?
6 Accordingly, even to the degree that this literature accounts for the possibility that interest groups might seek to influence bureaucratic decision-making, its hypotheses speak to the legislative choice about agency design and discretionary authority rather than to individual group choices about which venue to lobby, and less to the representational consequences of those choices. In short they do not deliver implications that this paper addresses. The Federal data come from reports filed under the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), which requires groups to file reports in specific policy areas and also to include information about the various components of government that they contacted, including the legislature and the administrative branch. We use Baumgartner and Leech's (2001) data compiled from reports filed in 1996. Our second source of data arises from reports filed by groups in Minnesota; we compiled these data from the state's Campaign Finance Regulation web site.
These reports include comparable information on lobbying across policy areas and venues.
Relying on two different data sets provides a number of strengths for our study. First, we are able to provide a more robust understanding of the prevalence of administrative lobbying by studying it at multiple levels of government. Second, the data were gathered by independent research teams under different guises, reducing the chances that any similarities between the two are due to decisions made by the researchers. Third, the reporting schemes for policy areas are different: groups are required to report in seventy-seven specific policy areas at the Federal level; in Minnesota, groups choose their own areas, which we relied on in developing our own coding of policy areas. The definition of a lobbyist consists of three components. First, it includes individuals who receive compensation of at least $3,000 from all sources in a given year for engaging in the lobbying activities just described. Second, it includes individuals who spend at least $250 of their money engaging in lobbying activities (travel costs are exempt). Finally, any local official or government employee who spend at least 50 hours in a month lobbying the government (excluding that individual's political subdivision) is a lobbyist. Groups that lobby are required to register if they spend more than $500 on a lobbyist in a calendar year or if they spend in excess of $50,000 on their own lobbying activities. Registration of lobbyists and principals must occur within three days any lobbying activities.
Lobbying data are compiled from a summary file of lobbyist reports available from the state web site. 11 For each of the groups that a lobbyist represents, the report lists the general issues to be lobbied on and, for each issue, a list of the venues to be lobbied. Including 321 cases of lobbyists that failed to report an issue for a given organization, we have a total of 5935 lobbyist-issue-organization and 3975 issue-organization observations from 1092
organizations. For the purposes of this paper, we focus only on groups that lobby the legislature or the administrative branch, excluding the 24% of all groups that report only metropolitan lobbying. We leave the analysis of additional venues for future research.
Overall, lobbyists report activity on a total of 669 alphanumerically unique issues in these data. In order to study lobbying activity across policy areas, we code these issues into ninetysix different policy areas based on a list of suggested reporting categories from the state's web site.
12 Most groups use these categories for reporting; many of the exceptions are merely minor variations or misspellings of the ninety-six policy areas. 13 We refer to these categories as "policies" or "policy areas," rather than as "issues," in order to distinguish between
Baumgartner and Leech's usage of the word issue, which may refer to specific proposals or bills; we consider policy areas to be, in general, at a higher level of aggregation.
Lobbying Data at the Federal Level
To study lobbying across venues and policy areas at the Federal level, we utilize data filed under the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act. The LDA requires groups to file semi-annual reports listing their total lobbying expenditures if they exceed a minimum threshold of lobbying activity (spending at least $20,500 in 1996 or employing an individual who devotes at least 20% of her time to lobbying activities during a six-month period), though the definition of lobbying excludes most forms of grassroots lobbying as well as notice and comment participation. In particular, we rely on Baumgartner and Leech's (2001) data on 1996 filings, which they have made available online.
14 While the level of detail varies, each report contains information on lobbyists, lobbying targets, and lobbying expenditures.
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Whereas Baumgartner and Leech (2001) were interested in the number of groups involved in a sample of 137 issues (out of 49,518 total issues mentioned in the reports), we focus on group activity in and across policy areas in order to maintain comparability to the Minnesota data. Because the LDA requires groups to file separate reports for seventy-six different policy areas (now seventy-seven with the addition of Homeland Security), it is relatively straightforward to calculate lobbying activity at the group-policy level. Further, we can study lobbying across venues using the information in these reports: groups are asked to list which branch of government they contacted for each policy area, including the House, Senate, White House and the number of agencies. To compare lobbying activity across the legislative and administrative venues, we determine whether a group mentions either the House or Senate and whether they mention an agency. Unfortunately, information about lobbyists and expenditures is not reported separately by policy area or venue. Finally, we rely on Baumgartner and Leech's coding of these 5838 groups into eleven categories based on the organization's type or the substantive interest they represent. 16 This information allows us to study the distribution of organizations across venues.
Levels of Analysis
Using the two data sources described above, we construct three measures of lobbying across venues. First, we use the Minnesota data to construct measures of venue choice at the group-policy-lobbyist level by creating dichotomous variables indicating whether each lobbyist reported lobbying the legislature or the administrative branch. In Washington, D.C.,
we create similar variables at the group-policy-report level based on whether each report listed a branch of Congress or at least one agency. Second, we aggregate to the group-policy level and create variables indicating whether a group had at least one lobbyist reporting the legislative or administrative venues for each policy area. Finally, we make the same calculation at the group level by determining whether each group had at least one lobbyist on any policy for each venue. While we would prefer to have a more detailed measure of group activity across venues, such as lobbying effort or expenditures, we follow Baumgartner and Leech's (2001) approach by counting reports (or lobbyists employed) by venue and policy area in order to obtain more information on whether groups devote any attention to different venues. We do this because we are interested in representation not just by specific groups, but by the representation of groups in specific policy areas; venue choice is made in the context of different policies, so studying it at that level is crucial.
As an example, consider the reports filed by the Automotive Service Industry Association, which indicated a six-month expenditure of $80,000. It filed eight different reports in seven subject areas. For the two reports in the Clean Air and Water policy area, one indicates only administrative lobbying while the other lists both administrative and legislative lobbying.
Of the other six reports, four are in policy areas with just legislative lobbying, one has only administrative lobbying and one lists both venues. In our group-policy-report level data set, then, we have eight observations for this group: five of them mention Congress, two mention both Congress and the administrative branch, and one lists just the administrative branch.
When we aggregate to the group-policy level, there are seven observations: five policy areas mentioning just Congress and two mentioning both venues. Finally, at the group level this association is recorded as lobbying both venues.
The Incidence of Lobbying Across Venues Table 1 offers our first look at the total amount of interest group lobbying across venues. The main result from this table is that a substantial amount of interest group lobbying occurs in the administrative venue, ranging from 33% to 41% at different levels of aggregation. In different terms, the average group lobbies in 1.6 of the two venues we examine; the average report or lobbyist lists 1.4 venues.
[ Table 1 Here.]
A number of other notable features emerge. First, the percentages of groups lobbying in the administrative branch at the Federal level and in Minnesota are almost identical at comparable levels of aggregation; second, they both indicate less venue specialization at higher levels of aggregation. Starting with the group-policy-lobbyist and group-policy-report level, the percentages mentioning the administrative branch are 34% in Minnesota and 33%
in Washington, D.C.; these both increase to 35% at the group-policy level. At the group level, 37% of groups in Minnesota and 41% of groups in Washington, D.C. mention the administrative branch. These numbers indicate that there is more specialization in venues at the policy level than at the group level, suggesting that groups make different venue choice decisions for different policies. The fact that groups' venue choices are policy-specific is consistent with the notion that political representation within a policy area depends on the details of the policy area, the legislative and executive design of policymaking processes, or both.
As an aside, aggregate expenditure figures by venue for the state of Minnesota show a much greater tilt of lobbying activity toward the legislative venue than reports do. 17 Almost 90% of lobbying disbursements are targeted to that branch, suggesting that legislative lobbying requires more expenditure-intensive activities than administrative lobbying does. On the other hand, the disbursements data exclude lobbyist salaries, which constitute about 75% of total lobbying expenditures. To the extent that administrative lobbying relies more heavily on lobbyists' time, then the disbursements figures will overstate attention to the legislature.
We hope to return to this issue in future work.
Venue Choice at the Group Level
In this section we compare the attention and resources devoted across venues by individual groups. Groups' choices of venue or venues in which to lobby is of interest for several reasons. For example, if many groups focus only on one venue, it would increase the chance that representation varies across venues. Additionally, it seems reasonable to presume that a group will allocate its resources to the venue or venues that are most productive in achieving the group's goals (see, e.g., Boehmke, Gailmard and Patty 2006) . Thus, there are several reasons that one might want to know whether the same groups are represented in both the legislative and administrative venues.
We use our data on group lobbying registrations to tackle these questions in two ways.
First, we examine the pattern of venue choice for individual groups by tabulating lobbying by venue, allowing us to determine how many groups focus on a single venue and how many lobby in both venues. We also report correlations of venue choice at the group-policy level. Second, we compare the amounts of attention devoted to legislative and administrative lobbying by comparing the number of lobbyists or reports for each venue. Admittedly, this is a very coarse measure of the amount of attention, but it still provides a more detailed analysis of groups' allocation of attention across venues and the degree of specialization for groups lobbying both venues. Table 2 reports the tabulations of venues at the group level and at the group-policy level.
There are a number of interesting results in this table. First, almost no groups specialize solely in administrative lobbying: over 94% of the groups at both levels of government and at both levels of analysis lobby the legislature. Nonetheless, a majority of groups do indicate an interest in the administrative branch, with about 59% of groups registering in both venues.
At the same time, about 49% of registrations at the group-policy level are in both venues, suggesting that groups often specialize in specific venues when appropriate for a given policy area. This tendency is further suggested by the fact that groups that are involved with both branches are involved with more policies: groups interested in just the legislative venue indicate activity on 2.7 policies in Minnesota and 1.8 policies in Washington, whereas those interested in both venues indicate interest in 3.9 and 2.9 policies, respectively. Again, note the similarity between the results at both levels of government.
[ Table 2 Here.]
Because so few groups lobby just the administrative branch and nearly half of those that lobby the legislature also lobby the administrative branch, there is mixed evidence regarding venue specialization. While some groups specialize in legislative lobbying, very few specialize in only administrative lobbying. By and large, however, the majority of groups tend to lobby both venues. Since groups that pursue administrative lobbying are largely a subset of groups that pursue legislative lobbying, it seems unlikely that the administrative venue opens the policy process to interests unheard elsewhere in it.
Moving from whether groups express any interest in either venue to the amount of atten- [ Figure 1 Here.]
It is clear from Figure 1 that the greatest proportion of groups devote the same amount of attention to each venue, as the largest circles are on the diagonal line for equal lobbying. For instance, at the Federal level 80% of groups with one administrative report have one legislative report; 74% of those with two administrative have two legislative; etc. In Minnesota, the percentages are over 75% for all cases involving one to five administrative lobbyists. The exception, of course, is for groups that have no administrative lobbyists: the majority of these groups has one legislative lobbyist and a sizable proportion has two. It is also apparent that most groups have more legislative than administrative lobbyists. Finally, as evidenced by the largely empty space below the 45 degree line, one characteristic of the Minnesota lobbying system is that almost no lobbyist lists only the administrative branch.
Activity Across Venues by Policy Area
In this section we examine the aggregate level of attention to the two venues within each policy area. Substantively, this analysis provides a picture of which of the two venues is seen by the participants in the process to be more important in each policy area. For example, the administrative venue might receive significantly more attention than the legislative venue in certain policy areas because of administrative specialization, delegated discretionary powers, and/or legislative abdication in those policy realms.
This analysis is also important from the standpoint of representation. Specifically, the presence of a dominant venue within a policy area may produce an advantage for organizations that have a comparative advantage in lobbying that venue. Thus, any variation in the relative levels of aggregate attention paid to the two venues across policy areas necessarily raises questions about the uniformity of representation of different interests within different realms of public policy.
To address this issue, we count the number of groups mentioning each venue for each policy area, which allows us to compare the Minnesota and Federal data. This variable reflects the number of groups paying at least some attention to each venue. Scatter plots based on these calculations are presented in Figure 2 . Because there are a different number of policy areas in the two data sets and because the scale of activity is much greater at the Federal level, we use two different sets of axes. Further, the data are presented on a log-log scale in order to better separate the large number of policy areas with relatively low levels of lobbying from the few policy areas that attract the bulk of lobbying.
[ Figure 2 Here.]
The results in this figure are unequivocal: activity levels in one venue are strongly as- Consistent with our earlier findings, more groups mention the legislative venue than the administrative venue in every policy, and at both levels of government. In Minnesota, the average ratio of legislative to administrative groups is 1.90; at the Federal level it is 2.27.
Interestingly, this ratio shrinks as the number of groups in a given policy increases, though more so at the Federal level.
Representation Across Venues
The analysis so far give some sense that representation in the bureaucracy tracks representation in the legislative branch -at least when measured by lobbyists or reports. The groups active and pressing their issues in the legislature are also active and pressing their issues in the bureaucracy. Put differently, whoever the bureaucracy is hearing from and on whatever issues, they are not hearing from interests wanting for representation elsewhere in the policy
process.
Yet the analysis so far tells us little about the identity of those groups, and therefore about the composition of the interests heard. Because around 50% of groups lobby both venues for a given policy, it could be the case that the overall pattern of representation is quite different across venues. To address this issue, we rely exclusively on the Federal data, which partition groups into ten categories. Following Baumgartner and Leech's (2001) approach with these same data, we combine the professional lobbying firms category with the business and corporation category and create an "institutions" category by combining universities, hospitals, and other institutions, resulting in seven final categories. Because groups can report lobbying in either or both venues, we examine the distribution of organizations based on three categories: (1) those that lobby the administrative venue, (2) those that lobby the legislative venue, and (3) those that lobby both venues. To compare representation across venues, we calculate the distribution of organizational types for each of these categories, both at the group-policy level and at the group level. Because the proportions in each column depend on the venue choice decisions of all types of groups, they make it harder to understand the pattern of venue choice for each category of group. In order to illuminate this issue we also report the distribution of venue choice by organization type.
[ Table 3 Here.]
The results are presented in Table 3 . Overall, the distribution of organizations within one venue is fairly similar to the distribution in the other, suggesting that any representational bias indicated by activity in the legislature venue extends to the administrative venue as well. Some interesting patterns emerge beyond this. In particular, business dominance is greater among groups that lobby a single venue than among those that lobby both, with its percentage increasing from 40% of observations in both venues to about 45% of observations in just the legislature at both the group and group-policy levels to 48% of observations in just the administrative branch at the group-policy level and 60% at the group level. Citizen groups, on the other hand, comprise a lower percentage of groups in the administrative branch at both levels of analysis. After business groups, only trade associations and government organizations are better represented in the administrative branch-only column. Our findings for the administrative venue are consistent with previous work that examines representation only in the notice and comment process (Golden 1998 ).
The comparison across venues demonstrates a somewhat surprising similarity between citizen and business groups: along with institutions, citizen and business groups are the only categories of groups at the group-policy level for which a majority lobby just the legislature rather than both venues. At the group level, these three categories are still the most likely to lobby only the legislature, but the proportion has dropped nearer to a third rather than a half. At both levels of analysis, business groups are the most likely to lobby only the administrative branch, with 5.1% of observations at the group-policy level and 5.3% at the group level. Citizen groups are the least likely to lobby just this venue at the group level (1.5%) and the second least likely at the group-policy level (3.4%). Because of their greater numerosity, of course, these small differences lead to a much greater edge for businesses in the administrative venue. Another interesting finding comes from comparing the pattern of venue choice across the group and group policy levels of analysis. Specifically, professional associations, government organizations and citizen groups are much more likely to lobby in just the administrative venue at the group-policy level, which helps explain why they constitute twice as high a proportion of groups in this venue at the same level of observation.
While these results advance our understanding of representation of types of interests across venues, they must be read in light of four tempering facts. First, the number of groups lobbying in just the administrative branch is small (less than 5% for both levels of analysis). Accordingly (and somewhat unsurprisingly), the portrait of representation is sparser in this venue than in the legislative branch. Second, the differences are still relatively small, particularly at the group-policy level: the overall pattern of representation is fairly consistent across the three venues and exhibits the well-known, pro-business bias 
Representation Across Venues & Policies
In this section we continue to focus on the issue of representation of group types across venues, but add a comparison across policy areas, in order to obtain a better understanding of the locus of business dominance vis-à-vis citizen groups. To make this comparison we implement a number of simplifications, since it would very difficult to fully investigate the distribution of nine types of groups across three venue choice outcomes and seventy-six policy areas. First, we focus only on the representation of business groups vis-à-vis citizen groups.
This is not to suggest that representation by other types of groups is not important. Rather, much scholarly attention is focused on the divide between these two categories. Second, we compare groups that lobby only the legislature with those that lobby the administrative branch -either on its own or in addition to the legislative branch. We do this in recognition of the fact that very few groups lobby just the administrative branch: the major decision appears to be whether to lobby the administrative branch in addition to the legislature.
Finally, we use the ratio of the number of citizen groups to the number of businesses as our measure of representational disparity. Low values correspond to business dominance. This leaves us with two numbers for each policy area: the citizen to business ratio for groups that only lobby the legislature and the same ratio for groups that lobby the administrative branch, either alone or in addition to the legislature (hereafter, we refer to the latter category as the combined administrative category).
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[ Figure 3 Here.]
For the legislative venue the mean value across policy areas is .78 while the median is .15.
For the combined administrative category the mean is .73 and the median is .17. The two categories reveal a substantively similar degree of business dominance. It certainly does not seem that access to administrative policy channels counterbalances the business dominance in legislative lobbying.
Because the distributions of these ratios are highly skewed and clustered toward smaller values, we convert them to a log scale. Liberties, Pharmacy, and Animals. Given that most of these are areas one would expect to be dominated by businesses, it is interesting that citizen groups do better in the combined administrative category.
An interesting feature of this figure is that there are few policy areas in which one type of group dominates in one venue while the other type of group dominates in the other. Of course, this may be a consequence of the fact that our combined administrative category includes groups that lobby both venues, which inevitably reduces the clarity of our findings, though we note that the figure is not terribly different if we use groups that only lobby one venue. The two exceptions would be Animals, for which business has a fifteen to one advantage in the legislature while citizen groups have an eleven to two advantage in the administrative branch, and, to a lesser extent, Urban Development/Municipalities, for which business groups' two to one advantage is reversed in the combined administrative category.
Note that these are the actual number of groups, so the latter is based on only three groups of each type.
Discussion: Participation in Administrative Policymaking
A consistent pattern in the evidence above is of an interest group ecology that, collectively, attempts to direct administrative agencies to much the same set of groups and issues as the legislature. 21 This has several important implications for the role of the bureaucracy in the policy process. First, the strategic calculus behind these venue choice decisions suggests that groups do not feel content to lobby the legislature and let it direct the bureaucracy in turn.
Rather, our data suggest that many groups who lobby at all spread their lobbying efforts throughout the policymaking process. They consistently use more resources, at least when measured by lobbyists or reports, on legislative than administrative lobbying, but in general, the more they use on one, the more they use on the other. This is difficult to rationalize unless the groups believe that bureaucratic agencies do possess discretionary authority over some or all policies that the groups care about. If agencies were mere ciphers or subordinate actors for the legislature, the legislature would see most or all lobbying action. Lobbying the bureaucracy would only support policy choices that could be overturned at will by the legislature if the latter were the source of all policy direction, rendering bureaucratic lobbying largely useless.
Furthermore, to the extent that the lobbying activities as measured here are consequential in the determination of public policy outcomes, our findings indicate that administrative policy processes may simply reinforce the advantages possessed by particular groups and policies in the legislature. Administrative lobbying does not broaden the representation of interests beyond those that pursue representation within the legislative venue. That would require interests and issues relatively inactive in the legislature to be more active in the administrative venue, which would yield different distribution of organization types in the two venues. Across several measures, that is not the case.
A natural explanation for this pattern of activity is the basic logic of collective action (Olson 1965) . Administrative lobbying may be subject to essentially the same collective action problems as legislative lobbying. To that extent, it makes sense that groups very active in the legislature would also be relatively active in the bureaucracy.
In any case, this pattern sheds light on the effect of participation opportunities in bureaucratic policy-making. 22 The bureaucratic venue presents another opportunity for the active, high-spending interests that predominate in legislative lobbying to be heard. The lobbying patterns it is exposed to do not direct it to broaden the set of groups or policies privileged in other parts of the policy process. Our data suggest that -at least as measured by lobbying activities -any representational biases that exist in the legislature carry over to the administrative branch as well.
Conclusion
This study constitutes the first broad examination of interest group representation across multiple venues. Using existing data from the Federal government and a new data set from the state of Minnesota, we are able to answer a number of important questions about administrative lobbying vis-à-vis legislative lobbying. First and foremost, administrative lobbying is a widespread phenomenon: about two-thirds of all registered lobbying organizations indicate at least some interest in this venue. Second, for most groups, larger levels of activity in one venue are matched by larger levels of activity in the other venue. Finally, within many policy areas, the well-documented pro-business bias in lobbying activity exists in both venues.
In terms of representation, the findings are simultaneously revealing and potentially troubling. Of course, we are cognizant that registered lobbying is only one form of participation in the policy process; our data do not include groups that engage solely in "outside" lobbying, groups that fall below the reporting thresholds, or additional forms of participation in the bureaucracy, whether through the process of notice and comment or through service on advisory committees. These alternate forms of participation may open up the door to groups not represented in our data; studies that analyze the distribution of groups in notice and comment, however, also find a significant pro-business bias, whether measured by participation (Golden 1998, Furlong and Kerwin 2005) or influence (Yackee and Yackee 2006) .
Further, it is worth repeating the caveat that our data on lobbying are quite coarse, extending no further than the number of lobbyists or reports that groups devote to or file in each venue for a given policy area. While presence is an important measure of representation, finer measure of lobbying activity may help illuminate the issue in more detail and help us understand the conditions under which representation can lead to access and, ultimately, influence (see, e.g., Hansen 1991; Kollman 1997) .
In general, the study of interest group activity across multiple venues allows analysis of many new questions and ways of assessing the policy process as a whole. Datasets containing detailed information on activities and expenditures and that link lobbying behavior across venues are only now becoming available. As they do, we believe that exploring how an interest group's strategic problem of venue choice is related to the characteristics of each issue, the relevant venues, and the behavior of other interests active on that issue will provide important insights into the consequences of government structure for representation.
This argument is consistent with recent work that argues that research on interest group lobbying should pay greater attention to the role that issues play in determining interest group lobbying decisions (see, e.g., Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, and Kimball 2009) and the characteristics of interest group lobbying communities. For example, recent studies (e.g., Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira, and Semanko 2005; and Lowery, Gray, Fellowes, and Anderson 2004) show that aggregate interest group activity across policy areas responds to government activity in those areas. We believe that adding information on groups' menu of venues in which to seek representation to these approaches is a logical step that will simultaneously add to our understandings of policymaking and interest group behavior.
Notes
1 Most major studies of representation in the interest group universe put the proportion of business interests anywhere from 50% to 80%, depending on how broadly those interests are construed (see, e.g., Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman 1984; Walker 1991; Gray and Lowery 1996; or Baumgartner and Leech 2001) 2 This hope is crystallized by but not unique to the optimistic take of Francis Rourke:
"One of the historic functions of bureaucracy in America has been to provide a means of effective expression in policy deliberations for community groups that are inarticulate, poorly organized, or for some other reason unable to speak for themselves. With administrative help, these stepchildren of the political system may acquire a political equality with other groups that they could never hope to attain through the ordinary processes of politics alone" ( 1976); see also, e.g., Ricucci ( 1995, pp. 6-8) and Mosher ( 1982) .
3 See Baumgartner and Leech (1998) for a summary of the representation, legislative lobbying, and campaign contributions literatures. 4 We do not wish to overlook studies of interest group representation in other venues, of course: see, e.g., Caldeira and Wright's (1990) study of organized interest representation in amici curiae before the Supreme Court.
5 Other, earlier studies, considered the possibility of bureaucratic lobbying (e.g., Spiller 1990;
Laffont and Tirole 1993), but it must be acknowledged that the form that bureaucratic lobbying is generally assumed to take -direct transfers -is in direct opposition to both de facto and de jure structure of modern administrative policymaking in the United States.
6 The answers to this question differ between the papers, based largely on the type of problem the agency is presumed to solve on behalf of the legislature. For example, Epstein and O'Halloran (1990), Sloof (2000) , and Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) generally agree that discretionary authority will be decreasing in the divergence between the preferences of the median legislator and those of the agency head (e.g., the President). Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) also tap into this logic and extend it to cover the effect of lobbying, in addition to preference divergence, on bureaucratic discretion. Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty (2006) point to a different logic, under which preference divergence is necessary to increase informational lobbying in the bureaucracy, which is desirable to the legislature for policy purposes.
7 In addition, the hypotheses generated by the works cited require measures of agency and legislators' preferences, discretionary authority, and/or levels of policy uncertainty that prevail in different issue areas. While these may be available in the future, we most certainly are not aware of existing and appropriate measures. (Baumgartner and Leech 2001) ; authors' data compiled from Minnesota lobbying report. Minnesota data exclude 262 groups that only engaged in metropolitan lobbying. Entries, with the exception of spending data, are the number of observations mentioning each venue at least once at the listed levels of observation. See text for additional details. 
Minnesota
Note. The diagonal line corresponds to equal levels of lobbying in the two venues. Cases with six or more administrative or fifteen or more legislative lobbyists or reports were collapsed into one category for presentation (twenty and three cases, respectively, at the federal level and eight and two cases in Minnesota). Minnesota data exclude all groups that only engaged in metropolitan lobbying. Note. Legislative-only category includes all cases for which a group mentions only the legislature; the any administrative category includes all cases for which groups mention only the administrative branch or both the administrative and legislative venues. The diagonal line indicates equal ratios in both venues, while the dashed lines correspond to the average ratio in each venue in the full group-policy data set. A few policy areas are lost due to the presence of no businesses or citizen groups. See the text for more information. The three letter codes are used by the Federal government for each policy area (see http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/ld-198.pdf or Baumgartner and Leech's codebook for the LDA data.)
